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The Hatsopoulos-Gyftopoulos resolution of the Schro¨dinger-Park paradox about the
concept of “state” in quantum statistical mechanics
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A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual “state” in the
present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics (and in its quantum information theory in-
terpretation as well). The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of an almost forgotten corollary
proved by E. Schro¨dinger in 1936 and perused by J.L. Park, Am. J. Phys. 36, 211 (1968). To resolve
it, we must either reject as unsound the concept of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of
quantum theory and the role of statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss a possible resolution
proposed in 1976 by G.N. Hatsopoulos and E.P. Gyftopoulos, Found. Phys. 6, 15, 127, 439, 561
(1976).
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 05.30.-d, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Wj
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1936, Schro¨dinger [1] published an article to de-
nounce a “repugnant” but unavoidable consequence of
the present formulation of Quantum Mechanics (QM)
and Quantum Statistical Mechanics (QSM). Schro¨dinger
claimed no priority on the mathematical result, and prop-
erly acknowledged that it is hardly more than a corollary
of a theorem about statistical operators that von Neu-
mann proved five years earlier [2].
Thirty years later, Park [3] exploited von Neumann’s
theorem and Schro¨dinger’s corollary to point out quite
conclusively an essential tension undermining the log-
ical conceptual framework of QSM (and of its Quan-
tum Information Theory interpretation as well). Twenty
more years later, Park returned on the subject in an-
other magistral, but almost forgotten paper [4] in which
he addresses the question of “whether an observer mak-
ing measurements upon systems from a canonical ensem-
ble can determine whether the systems were prepared by
mixing, equilibration, or selection”, and concludes that
“a generalized quantal law of motion designed for com-
patibility with fundamental thermodynamic principles,
would provide also a means for resolving paradoxes asso-
ciated with the characteristic ambiguity of ensembles in
quantum mechanics.”
Schro¨dinger’s corollary was “rediscovered” by Jaynes
[5, 6] and Gisin [7], and generalized by Hughston, Jozsa,
and Wooters [8] and Kirkpatrick [9]. Also some interpre-
tation has been re-elaborated around it [10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15], but unfortunately the original references have
not always been duly cited. The problem at issue in this
paper, first raised in Ref. [1], has been acknowledged
“in passing” in innumerable other references (see, e.g.,
Refs. [16, 17] and references therein), but none has to
our knowledge gone so deeply and conclusively to the
conceptual roots as Refs. [3, 4]. For this reason it is
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useful once in a while to refresh our memory about the
pioneering conceptual contributions by Schro¨dinger and
Park. The crystal clear logic of their analyses should not
be forgotten, especially if we decide that it is necessary
to “go beyond”. Ref. [1] has been cited by many others,
but not about the problem we focus on here, rather for it
also contains pioneering contributions to the question of
entanglement, EPR paradox and related nonlocal issues.
Both Refs. [1] and [3, 4] have been often cited also
in relation to the projection postulate and the quantum
measurement problem.
The tension that Park vividly brings out in his beau-
tiful essay on the “nature of quantum states” is about
the central concept of individual state of a system. The
present formulation of QM and the standard interpreta-
tion of QSM imply the paradoxical conclusion that ev-
ery system is “a quantum monster”: a single system can
be thought as concurrently being “in” two (and actually
even more) different states. We briefly review the issue
below (as we have done also in Ref. [18]), but we urge
everyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory
to read the original references [3, 4]. The problem has
been widely overlooked and is certainly not well known,
in spite of the periodic rediscoveries. The overwhelming
successes of QM and QSM understandably contributed
to discourage or dismiss as useless any serious attempt
to resolve the nevertheless unavoidable fundamental dif-
ficulty.
Here, we emphasize that a resolution of the tension
requires a serious re-examination of the conceptual and
mathematical foundations of quantum theory. We dis-
cuss three logical alternatives. We point out that one of
these alternatives achieves a resolution of the fundamen-
tal difficulty without contradicting any of the successes
of the present mathematical formalism in the equilibrium
realm where it is backed by experiments. However, it re-
quires an essentially new and different re-interpretation
of the physical meaning of such successes. Moreover, in
the nonequilibrium domain it opens to new discoveries,
new physics compatible with the second law of thermo-
dynamics, without contradicting QM, and resolving the
2Boltzmann paradox about irreversibility as well. Ther-
modynamics may thus play once again a key role in a
conceptual advancement [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]
which may prelude to uncovering new physics about far
non-equilibrium dynamics [28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
II. SCHRO¨DINGER-PARK QUANTUM
MONSTERS
In this section, we review briefly the problem at issue.
We start with the seemingly harmless assumption that
every system is always in some definite, though perhaps
unknown, state. We will conclude that the assumption is
incompatible with the present formulation and interpre-
tation of QSM/QIT. To this end, we concentrate on an
important special class of systems that we call “strictly
isolated”. A system is strictly isolated if and only if (a)
it interacts with no other system in the universe, and (b)
its state is at all times uncorrelated from the state of any
other system in the universe.
The argument that “real systems can never be strictly
isolated and thus we should dismiss this discussion as
useless at the outset” is at once conterproductive, mis-
leading and irrelevant, because the concept of strictly
isolated system is a keystone of the entire conceptual ed-
ifice in physics, particularly indispensable to structure
the principle of causality. Hence, the strictly isolated
systems must be accepted, at least, as conceivable, in
the same way as we accept within QM that a vector in
Hilbert space may represent a state of a system. Here
we take as an essential necessary requirement that, when
applied to a conceivable system and in particular to an
isolated system, the formulation of a physical theory like
QSM must be free of internal conceptual inconsistencies.
In QM the states of a strictly isolated system are in
one-to-one correspondence with the one-dimensional or-
thogonal projection operators on the Hilbert space of the
system. We denote such projectors by the symbol P . If
|ψ〉 is an eigenvector of P such that P |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and
〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 then P = |ψ〉〈ψ|. It is well known that differ-
ently from classical states, quantum states are character-
ized by irreducible intrinsic probabilities. We give this
for granted here, and do not elaborate further on this
point.
Admittedly, the objective of QSM is to deal with situ-
ations in which the state of the system is not known with
certainty. Such situations are handled, according to von
Neumann [2] (but also to Jaynes [5, 6] within the QIT
approach) by assigning to each of the possible states of
the system an appropriate statistical weight which de-
scribes an “extrinsic” (we use this term to contrast it
with “intrinsic”) uncertainty as to whether that state is
the actual state of the system. The selection of a rule
for a proper assignment of the statistical weights is not
of concern to us here.
To make clear the meaning of the words extrinsic and
intrinsic, consider the following non quantal example. We
have two types of “biased” coins A and B for which
“heads” and “tails” are not equally likely. Say that
pA = 1/3 and 1 − pA = 2/3 are the intrinsic proba-
bilities of all coins of type A, and that pB = 2/3 and
1 − pB = 1/3 those of coins of type B. Each time we
need a coin for a new toss, however, we receive it from
a slot machine that first tosses an unbiased coin C with
intrinsic probabilities w = 1/2 and 1 − w = 1/2 and,
without telling us the outcome, gives us a coin of type
A whenever coin C yields “head” and a coin of type B
whenever C yields “tail”. Alternatively, we pick coins
out of a box where 50% coins of type A and 50% coins
of type B have been previously mixed. It is clear that
for such a preparation scheme, the probabilities w and
1−w with which we receive (pick up) coins of type A or
of type B have “nothing to do” with the intrinsic prob-
abilities pA, 1 − pA, and pB, 1 − pB that characterize
the biased coins we will toss. We therefore say that w
and 1 − w are extrinsic probabilities, that characterize
the heterogeneity of the preparation scheme rather than
features of the prepared systems (the coins). If on each
coin we receive we are allowed only a single toss (pro-
jection measurement?), then due to the particular values
(pA = 1/3, pB = 2/3 and w = 1/2) chosen for this
tricky preparation scheme, we get “heads” and “tails”
which are equally likely; but if we are allowed repeated
tosses (non-destructive measurements, gentle measure-
ments, quantum cloning measurements, continuous time
measurements?) then we expect to be able to discover
the trick. Thus it is only under the single-toss constraint
that we would not loose if we base our bets on a de-
scription of the preparation scheme that simply weighs
the intrinsic probabilities with the extrinsic ones, i.e.,
that would require us to expect “head” with probability
phead = wpA + (1− w)pB = 1/2 ∗ 1/3 + 1/2 ∗ 2/3 = 1/2.
For a strictly isolated system, the possible states ac-
cording to QM are, in principle, all the one-dimensional
projectors Pi on the Hilbert space H of the system.
Let P denote the set of all such one-dimensional pro-
jectors on H. If we are really interested in characterizing
unambiguously a preparation scheme that yields states
in the set P with some probability density, we should
adopt a measure theoretic description as proposed in
Ref. [18], and define a “statistical weight measure” µ sat-
isfying the normalization condition µ(P) = ∫
P
µ(dP ) = 1
and such that the expected value of an observable A
(which on the base states is given by Tr(PA)) is given
〈A〉 = ∫
P
Tr(PA)µ(dP ). As shown in Ref. [18], this de-
scription would not lead to the kind of ambiguities we are
lead to by adopting the von Neumann description, but
it would not lead to the von Neumann density operator
either.
Instead, following the von Neumann recipe, QSM and
QIT assign to each state Pi a statistical weight wi, and
characterizes the extrinsically uncertain situation by a
(von Neumann) statistical operator W =
∑
iwiPi, a
weighted sum of the projectors representing the possi-
ble states (W is more often called the density operator
3and denoted by ρ, but we prefer to reserve this symbol
for the state operators we define in the next section).
The von Neumann construction is ambiguous, because
the same statistical operator is assigned to represent a
variety of different preparations, with the only excep-
tion of homogeneous preparations (proper preparation
in the language of Ref. [33]) where there is only one
possible state Pψ with statistical weight 100% so that
W = W 2 = Pψ is “pure”. Given a statistical operator
W (a nonnegative, unit-trace, self-adjoint operator on
the Hilbert space of the system), its decomposition into
a weighted sum of one-dimensional projectors Pi with
weights wi implies that there is a preparation such that
the system is in state Pi with probability wi. The sit-
uation described by W has no extrinsic uncertainty if
and only if W equals one of the Pi’s, i.e., if and only
if W 2 = W = Pi (von Neumann’s theorem [2]). Then,
QSM reduces to QM and no ambiguities arise.
The problem is that wheneverW represents a situation
with extrinsic uncertainty (W 2 6=W ) then the decompo-
sition of W into a weighted sum of one-dimensional pro-
jectors is not unique. This is the essence of Schro¨dinger’s
corollary [1] relevant to this issue (for a mathematical
generalization see Ref. [9] and for interpretation in the
framework of non-local effects see e.g. Ref. [10]).
For our purposes, notice that every statistical (den-
sity) operator W , when restricted to its range Ran(W ),
has an inverse that we denote by W−1. If W 6= W 2,
then Ran(W ) is at least two-dimensional, i.e., the rank
of W is greater than 1. Let Pj = |ψj〉〈ψj | denote the or-
thogonal projector onto the one-dimensional subspace of
Ran(W ) spanned by the jth eigenvector |ψj〉 of an eigen-
basis of the restriction of W to its range Ran(W ) (j runs
from 1 to the rank of W ). Then, W =
∑
j wjPj where
wj is the j-th eigenvalue, repeated in case of degener-
acy. It is noteworthy that wj = [TrRan(W )(W
−1Pj)]
−1.
Schro¨dinger’s corollary states that, chosen an arbitrary
vector α1 in Ran(W ), it is always possible to construct a
set of vectors |αk〉 (k running from 1 to the rank of W ,
α1 being the chosen vector) which span Ran(W ) (but
are not in general orthogonal to each other), such that
the orthogonal projectors P ′k = |αk〉〈αk| onto the corre-
sponding one-dimensional subspaces of Ran(W ) give rise
to the alternative resolution of the statistical operator
W =
∑
k w
′
kP
′
k, with w
′
k = [TrRan(W )(W
−1P ′k)]
−1.
To fix ideas, consider the example of a qubit with the
statistical operator given byW = p|1〉〈1|+(1−p)|0〉〈0| for
some given p, 0 < p < 1. Consistently with Schro¨dinger’s
corollary, it is easy to verify that the same W can also
be obtained as a statistical mixture of the two projectors
|+〉〈+| and |a〉〈a| where |+〉 = (|0〉+|1〉)/√2, |a〉 = (|+〉+
a|−〉)/√1 + a2 (note that |a〉 and |+〉 are not orthogonal
to each other), |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2, a = 1/(1− 2p) and
w = 2p(1−p) so thatW = w|+〉〈+|+(1−w)|a〉〈a|. With
p = 1/4 this is exactly the example given by Park in Ref.
[3].
QSM forces on us the following interpretation of
Schro¨dinger’s corollary. The first decomposition of W
implies that we may have a preparation which yields the
system in state Pj with probability wj , therefore, the
system is for sure in one of the states in the set {Pj}.
The second decomposition implies that we may as well
have a preparation which yields the system in state P ′k
with probability w′k and, therefore, the system is for sure
in one of the states in the set {P ′k}. Because both de-
compositions hold true simultaneously, the very rules we
adopted to construct the statistical operator W allow us
to conclude that the state of the system is certainly one
in the set {Pj}, but concurrently it is also certainly one
in the set {P ′k}. Because the two sets of states {Pj} and
{P ′k} are different (no elements in common), this would
mean that the system “is” simultaneously “in” two dif-
ferent states, thus contradicting our starting assumption
that a system is always in one definite state (though per-
haps unknown). Little emphasis is gained by noting that,
because the possible different decompositions are not just
two but an infinity, we are forced to conclude that the
system is concurrently in an infinite number of differ-
ent states! Obviously such conclusion is unbearable and
perplexing, but it is unavoidable within the current for-
mulation of QSM/QIT. The reason why we have learnt
to live with this issue – by simply ignoring it – is that if
we forget about interpretation and simply use the math-
ematics, so far we always got successful results that are
in good agreement with experiments.
Also for the coin preparation example discussed above,
there are infinite ways to provide 50% head and 50%
tail upon a single toss of a coin chosen randomly out
of a mixture of two kinds of biased coins of opposite
bias. If we exclude the possibility of performing repeated
(gentle) measurements on each single coin, than all such
situations are indeed equivalent, and our adopting the
weighted sum of probabilities as a faithful representation
is in fact a tacit acceptance of the impossibility of mak-
ing repeated measurements. This limitation amounts to
accepting that the extrinsic probabilities (w,1−w) com-
bine irreducibly with the intrinsic ones (pA,pB), and once
this is done there is no way to separate them again (at
least not in a unique way). If these mixed probabilities
are indeed all that we can conceive, then we must give up
the assumption that each coin has its own possibly un-
known, but definite bias, because otherwise we are lead
to a contradiction, for we would conclude that there is
some definite probability that a single coin has at once
two different biases (a monster coin which belongs con-
currently to both the box of, say, 2/3 – 1/3 biased coins
and to the box of, say, 3/4 – 1/4 biased coins).
III. IS THERE A WAY OUT?
In this section we discuss four main alternatives to-
wards the resolution of the paradox, that is, if we wish to
clear our everyday, already complicated life from quan-
tum monsters. Indeed, even though it has been latent
for fifty years and it has not impeded major achieve-
4ments, the conceptual tension denounced by Schro¨dinger
and Park is untenable, and must be resolved.
Let us therefore restate the three main hinges of QSM
which lead to the logical inconsistency:
1. a system is always in a definite, though perhaps
unknown, state;
2. states (of strictly isolated systems) are in one-to-
one correspondence with the one-dimensional pro-
jectors P on the Hilbert space H of the system;
and
3. statistics of measurement results from a heteroge-
neous preparation with extrinsic uncertainty (prob-
abilities wi) as to which is the actual state of the
system among a set {Pi} of possible states is de-
scribed by the statistical operator W =
∑
i wiPi.
To remove the inconsistency, we must reject or modify at
least one of these statements. But, in doing so, we cannot
afford to contradict any of the innumerable successes of
the present mathematical formulation of QSM.
A first alternative was discussed by Park [3] in his
essay on the nature of quantum states. If we decide
to retain statements (2) and (3), then we must reject
statement (1), i.e., we must conclude that the concept
of state is “fraught with ambiguities and should there-
fore be avoided.” A system should never be regarded as
being in any physical state. We should dismiss as un-
sound all statements of this type: “Suppose an electron
is in state ψ . . . ” Do we need to undertake this alter-
native and therefore abandon deliberately the concept of
state ? Are we ready to face all the ramifications of this
alternative ?
A second alternative is to retain statements (1) and
(2), reject statement (3) and reformulate the mathemat-
ical description of situations with extrinsic uncertainty
in a way not leading to ambiguities. To our knowledge,
such a reformulation has never been considered. The key
defect of the representation by means of statistical op-
erators is that it mixes irrecoverably two different types
of uncertainties: the intrinsic uncertainties inherent in
the quantum states and the extrinsic uncertainties intro-
duced by the statistical description.
In Ref. [18], we have suggested a measure-theoretic
representation that would achieve the desired goal of
keeping the necessary separation between intrinsic quan-
tal uncertainties and extrinsic statistical uncertainties.
We will elaborate on such representation elsewhere.
Here, we point out that a change in the mathematical
formalism involves the serious risk of contradicting some
of the successes of the present formalism of QSM. Such
successes are to us sufficient indication that changes in
the present mathematical formalism should be resisted
unless the need becomes incontrovertible.
A third alternative is the QIT approach proposed by
Jaynes [5, 6] and subsequent literature. The paradox is
bypassed (rather than resolved) by introducing an ad-hoc
“recipe” whereby base states other than eigenstates of the
statistical operator W are to be excluded as unconceiv-
able, based on the belief that they do not represent “mu-
tually exclusive event” [34]. We skip here the well-known
details of the QIT ad-hoc recipe [5, 6] to obtain the max-
imal −Tr(W lnW ) statistical operator W which should
provide the “best, unbiased description” of the statis-
tics of measurement results. We need only point out,
for the purpose of our discussion, that such recipe leads
to the correct physical results (i.e., canonical and grand-
canonical thermodynamic equilibrium distributions) only
if (1) the experimenter is assumed to know the value
of the energy of the system, not of some other observ-
able(s); (2) the underlying pure components of the het-
erogeneous preparation are “mutually exclusive” in the
sense that they are the eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian
operator of the system. Then, QIT reduces to equilib-
rium QSM and expectation values are successfully com-
puted (from the pragmatic point of view) by the formula
〈A〉 = Tr(AW ) where W = exp(−βH)/Tr[exp(−βH)]
(or its grand-canonical equivalent). However, from the
conceptual point of view, the two ad-hoc conditions just
underlined are in clear conflict with the purely subjec-
tive interpretation assumed at the outset in the QIT ap-
proach, for they exclude choices that a truly unbiased
experimenter has no reason to exclude a priori. In other
words, the fact that such conditions are necessary to rep-
resent the right physics, implies that they represent ob-
jective (rather than subjective) features of physical real-
ity. In particular, they impose that among the many pos-
sible decompositions of the maximal−Tr(W lnW ) statis-
tical operator W , which exist by Schro¨dinger’s corollary,
the observer is allowed to give a physical meaning only
to the spectral decomposition, thereby being forced by
the recipe to an extremely biased perspective. So, by
ignoring and bypassing the Schro¨dinger-Park conceptual
paradox, the QIT approach not only does not resolve
it, but it opens up additional conceptual puzzles. For
example, what should W be if the experimenter knows
the value of a property other than energy, or is to de-
scribe statistics from a heterogeneous preparation which
is a mixture of pure preparations corresponding to non-
mutually-orthogonal QM states (non-mutually-exclusive
events)? From the application point of view, practi-
tioners in the chemical physics literature have devised
successful modeling and computational recipes based on
constrained maximal entropy [35, 36] or rate-controlled
constrained maximal entropy [37, 38] in which the en-
ergy constraint is replaced by or complemented with suit-
ably selected other constraining quantities, e.g., config-
urational averages [35, 36] or potentials globally charac-
terizing a class of slow rate-controlling reaction schemes
[37, 38]. But the empirical success of these approaches,
in our view, corroborates the need for further discussions
about the subjectivity-objectivity conceptual dilemma
which remains unresolved.
A fourth intriguing alternative has been first proposed
by Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos [19, 20, 21, 22] in 1976.
5The idea is to retain statement (1) and modify statement
(2) by adopting and incorporating the mathematics of
statement (3) to describe the true physical states, i.e.,
the homogeneous preparations, and at the same time de-
voiding heterogeneous preparations (and, therefore, ex-
trinsic statistics) of any fundamental role. The defining
features of the projectors P , which represent the states
for a strictly isolated system in QM, are: P † = P , P > 0,
TrP = 1, P 2 = P . The defining features of the statistical
(or density) operatorsW areW † =W ,W > 0, TrW = 1.
Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos propose to modify state-
ment (2) as follows:
(2’) (HG ansatz) States (of every strictly isolated sys-
tem) are in one-to-one correspondence with the
state operators ρ on H, where ρ† = ρ, ρ > 0,
Trρ = 1, without the restriction ρ2 = ρ. We call
these the “state operators” to emphasize that they
play the same role that in QM is played by the pro-
jectors P , according to statement (2) above, i.e.,
they are associated with the homogeneous (or pure
or proper) preparation schemes.
Mathematically, state operators ρ have the same defin-
ing features as the statistical (or density) operators W .
But their physical meaning according to statement (2’) is
sharply different. A state operator ρ represents a state.
Whatever uncertainties and probabilities it entails, they
are intrinsic in the state, in the same sense as uncer-
tainties are intrinsic in a state described (in QM) by a
projector P = |ψ〉〈ψ|. A statistical operator W, instead,
represents (ambiguously) a mixture of intrinsic and ex-
trinsic uncertainties obtained via a heterogeneous prepa-
ration. In Refs. [19, 20, 21, 22], all the successful
mathematical results of QSM are re-derived for the state
operators ρ. There, it is shown that statement (2’) is
non-contradictory to any of the (mathematical) successes
of the present QSM theory, in that region where theory
is backed by experiment. However it demands a seri-
ous re-interpretation of such successes because they now
emerge no longer as statistical results (partly intrinsic
and partly extrinsic probabilities), but as non-statistical
consequences (only intrinsic probabilities) of the nature
of the individual states.
In addition, statement (2’) implies the existence of a
broader variety of states than conceived of in QM (ac-
cording to statement (2)). Strikingly, if we adopt state-
ment (2’) with all its ramifications, those situations in
which the state of the system is not known with cer-
tainty stop playing the perplexing central role that in
QSM is necessary to justify the successful mathematical
results such as canonical and grand canonical equilib-
rium distributions. The physical entropy that has been
central in so many discoveries in physics, would have fi-
nally gained its deserved right to enter the edifice from
the front door. It would be measured by −kBTrρ ln ρ
and by way of statement (2’) and be related to intrinsic
probabilities, differently from the von Neumann measure
−TrW lnW which measures the state of uncertainty de-
termined by the extrinsic probabilities of a heterogeneous
preparation. We would not be anymore embarrassed by
the inevitable need to cast our explanations of single-
atom, single-photon, single-spin heat engines in terms of
entropy, and entropy balances.
The same observations would be true even in the clas-
sical limit [25], where the state operators tend to distri-
butions on phase-space. In that limit, statement (2’) im-
plies a broader variety of individual classical states than
those conceived of in Classical Mechanics (and described
by the Dirac delta distributions on phase-space). The
classical phase-space distributions, that are presently in-
terpreted as statistical descriptions of situations with ex-
trinsic uncertainty, can be readily reinterpreted as non-
statistical descriptions of individual states with intrinsic
uncertainty. Thus, if we accept this fourth alternative,
we must seriously reinterpret, from a new non-statistical
perspective, all the successes not only of quantum theory
but also of classical theory.
If we adopt the HG ansatz, the problem of describ-
ing statistics of measurement results from heterogeneous
preparations loses the fundamental role it holds in QSM
by virtue of statement (3). Nevertheless, when necessary,
the problem can be unambiguously addressed as follows
[18]:
(3’) Preparations of a given system are in one-to-one
correspondence with the normalized measures µ
that can be defined on the HG “quantal state do-
main of the system”, R, i.e., the set of all pos-
sible state operators ρ on H defined according
to statement (2’) [the normalization condition is
µ(R) = ∫
R
µ(dρ) = 1]. We call each such mea-
sure µ a “statistical-weight measure over the quan-
tal phase-domain of the system”. Statistics of mea-
surement results from a heterogeneous preparation
with extrinsic uncertainty (probabilities wi) as to
which is the actual state of the system among a
discrete set {ρi} of possible states is described by
the statistical-weight measure µ =
∑
iwiµρi where
µρi is the Dirac measure “centered” at state ρi.[45]
The discussion of such description, first introduced in
Ref. [18], is not essential here and will therefore be pre-
sented elsewhere (recently, some useful mathematical re-
sults have been developed along these lines, but in an-
other context, in Refs. [40, 41]). For the present purpose
it suffices to say that the Dirac measures are the only irre-
ducible measures that can be defined overR [18]. In fact,
any other measure can be decomposed in a unique way
into a “sum” of Dirac measures and is therefore reducible.
The physical meaning of the uniqueness of the “spectral”
resolution of any measure into its component Dirac mea-
sures is that the statistical descriptor µ associated with
any preparation is complete and unambiguous, because
its unique “spectral” resolution identifies unambiguously
every component homogeneous preparation through the
support of the corresponding Dirac measure, as well as
the respective statistical weight. As a result, this math-
6ematical description of heterogeneous preparations does
not lead to the Schro¨dinger-Park paradox and hence the
concept of state is saved.[46]
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, the Hatsopoulos-Gyftopoulos ansatz,
proposed thirty years ago in Refs. [19, 20, 21, 22] and
follow up theory [23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 42, 43], not only
resolves the Schro¨dinger-Park paradox without rejecting
the concept of state (a keystone of scientific thinking),
but forces us to re-examine the physical nature of the in-
dividual states (quantum and classical), and finally gains
for thermodynamics and in particular the second law a
truly fundamental role, the prize it deserves not only for
having never failed in the past 180 years since its discov-
ery by Carnot, but also for having been and still being a
perpetual source of reliable advise as to how things work
in Nature.
In this paper, we restate a seldom recognized con-
ceptual inconsistency which is unavoidable within the
present formulation of QSM/QIT and discuss briefly log-
ical alternatives towards its resolution. Together with
Schro¨dinger [1] who first surfaced the paradox and Park
[3, 4] who first magistrally explained the incontrovert-
ible tension it introduces around the fundamental con-
cept of state of a system, we maintain that this fun-
damental difficulty is by itself a sufficient reason to go
beyond QSM/QIT, for we must resolves the “essential
tension” which has sapped the conceptual foundations
of the present formulation of quantum theory for almost
eighty years.
We argue that rather than adopting the drastic way
out provokingly prospected by Park, namely, that we
should reject as unsound the very concept of state of
a system (as we basically do every day by simply ig-
noring the paradox), we may alternatively remove the
paradox by rejecting the present statistical interpreta-
tion of QSM/QIT without nevertheless rejecting the suc-
cesses of its mathematical formalism. The latter reso-
lution is satisfactory both conceptually and mathemat-
ically, but requires that the physical meaning of the
formalism be reinterpreted with care and detail. Fac-
ing the situation sounds perhaps uncomfortable because
there seems to be no harmless way out, but if we adopt
the Hatsopoulos-Gyftopoulos fundamental ansatz (of ex-
istence of a broader kinematics) the change will be at first
mainly conceptual, so that practitioners who happily get
results everyday out of QSM would basically maintain the
status quo, because we would maintain the same math-
ematics both for the time-independent state operators
that give us the canonical and grand-canonical descrip-
tion of thermodynamics equilibrium states, and for the
time-dependent evolution of the idempotent density op-
erators (ρ2 = ρ), i.e., the states of ordinary QM, which
keep evolving unitarily. On the other hand, if the ansatz
is right, new physics is likely to emerge, for it would
imply that beyond the the states of ordinary QM, there
are states (“true” states, obtained from preparations that
are “homogeneous” in the sense of von Neumann [2]) that
even for an isolated and uncorrelated single degree of free-
dom “have physical entropy” (−kBTrρ ln ρ) and require
a non-idempotent state operator (ρ2 6= ρ) for their de-
scription, and therefore exhibit even at the microscopic
level the limitations imposed by the second law,
In addition, if we adopt as a further ansatz that the
time evolution of these non-ordinary-QM states (the non-
idempotent ones) obeys the nonlinear equation of mo-
tion developed by the present author [23, 26, 27, 31, 32,
42, 43], then in most cases they do not evolve unitarily
but follow a path that results from the competition of
the Hamiltonian unitary propagator and a new internal-
redistribution propagator that “pulls” the state operator
ρ in the direction of steepest entropy ascent (maximal
entropy generation) until it reaches a (partially) canoni-
cal form (or grand canonical, depending on the system).
Full details can be found in Refs. [27, 30].
The proposed resolution definitely goes beyond QM,
and turns out to be in line with Schro¨dinger’s prescient
conclusion of his 1936 article [1] when he writes: “My
point is, that in a domain which the present theory does
not cover, there is room for new assumptions without
necessarily contradicting the theory in that region where
it is backed by experiment.”
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